The parliamentary elections in Hungary to be held on April 12 may change, apart from other issues, church-state relations.
One of Europe’s longest-serving leaders, Viktor Orbán, seems to be losing, according to the polls. Prime Minister Orbán, who has been in power continuously since 2010 and leads right-wing party Fidesz, is contested by the opposition party Tisza, headed by former government insider Péter Magyarm who surfaces first in the polls.
Over the years, Orbán has transferred hundreds of state institutions to Church management, renovated churches, supported families and established the Hungary Helps agency for persecuted Christians abroad. His supporters applaud that he changed the Constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman and forbade gender ideology from schools.
Orbán has explicity linked Christianity to Hungary’s national identity, as he did last year in nearby Slovakia, where many ethnic Hungarians live, when he spoke at the funeral of Reformed bishop of Hungarian origin Géza Erdélyi. The deceased bishop, the Calvinist prime minister said, “knew that the cause of faith is also the cause of the nation.”
However, Orbán is not without his critics, even among Catholics, with some of his opponents having accused him of using Christianity and the nation for political ends. For example, Hungary Helps is seen by some as a fake program. “There is no real aid for persecuted Christians; it is only a government political propaganda,” István Gégény, a lay Catholic theologian and president of the Szemlélek Foundation, shared with the Register. He believes that Germany provides much more money for the same cause, doing it “as a normal thing, not as a heroic superprogram.”
A 2023 scandal involving Orbán’s political allies is another sore spot. Both Katalin Novák, Hungary’s president, and the minister of justice, Judit Varga, Magyar’s ex-wife, stepped down after it was revealed that they had co-signed a pardon of a man convicted of a sex-abuse cover-up at the behest of the head of the Hungarian Reformed Church, Zoltán Balog. The scandal prompted Magyar to break with Fidesz and head the Tisza party as Orbán’s main political opponent.
The main party opposing Orbán’s Fidesz party is “conservative, so there seems to be no room for” a marriage redefinition, said Gégény, although he admitted that the definition of family “may widen” to include other realities.
Tisza may “bring dangerous trends,” especially in bioethics, which, combined with public opinion, can initiate “worse legislation” loosening or in favor of “abortion, euthanasia and LGBTQ issues,” Norbert Filemon, a director of research at the Axioma Center, a Christian think tank, told the Register. Magyar supports changing the existing policy to allow adoptions by same-sex couples under certain conditions, the analyst added.
The Tisza party did not respond to a request for comment on what changes, if any, it would propose regarding abortion, assisted suicide, marriage and adoption of children.
Hungarian Bishops’ Position
Hungary has a significant portion of Christians, but the real number is hard to find. In the census of 2022, less than two-thirds of all citizens answered the question of religion. More than 70% claimed their religious affiliation. Of those who indicated their religion, 69% said they were Catholic and 23% Reformed. However, before the apostolic trip of Pope Francis to Hungary in 2023, the statistics published by the Holy See said 61% of Hungarians were Catholic.
Responding to a bill, submitted by the Democratic Coalition political party, which would require priests to break the seal of confession, the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued a statement in October 2025 addressed to “priests, all the faithful, and society,” stating that “we are not a political organization and do not intend to take part in the campaign.” We serve “the salvation of souls,” the conference clarified.
At the same time, the statement expressed shock “that a bill has been drafted that would require Catholic priests to violate the secrecy of confession.” The episcopate also said it regretted that “in the context of a heated election campaign, public discourse has become extremely coarse, and unfounded sentimentalism and slander are often present.”
“Most of the bishops prefer the current government” because they think that it is “more compatible with the social doctrine of the Church,” opined Filemon, who worked as a director of communications at the Archdiocese of Veszprém.
The Hungarian Christian leaders are mostly silent, yet no sin within the ruling party inspires “them to say anything, but when the opposite side does or says something morally problematic, they are ready to raise their voice,” Gégény lamented.
Therefore, “some bishops are undoubtedly active participant(s) in the campaign, all are on the side of Fidesz,” except for the bishop of Kaposvár, László Varga, added Gégény.
“It is normal for bishops” to express their view, said Filemon, who mentioned that in the past, Bishop Emeritus Miklós Beer of the Diocese of Vác “represented a more critical attitude toward the government.”
Recently, Bishop Emeritus Imre Asztrik Várszegi, former Benedictine abbot of Pannonhalma, criticized the language used in Fidesz’s campaign, according to a letter published by the website run by the Szemlélek Foundation, whose president is Gégény. The bishop was quoted as saying that “this insane (pathological) fight has nothing to do with Jesus Christ, our Church, or even with the remaining common sense of man.”
A Change for the Church?
In recent decades, Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran and Reformed churches have regained control of their schools after communism. As a result, the number of church-run educational institutions and their students has doubled since 2010 and is estimated to be around 18% of all schools, according to the government.
“The churches, especially the Catholic Church,” Filemon clarified, were the “backbone of education for centuries until 1948,” when the communists took over and confiscated the schools, allowing only a few to remain.
Likewise, the government has increased funding for them, but the analysts admit it is almost impossible to calculate how much it contributes.
In the case of a new Tisza-led government, reducing or restructuring such arrangements is expected.
It was a risk for the churches, and the future may only bring consequences, Gégény pointed out, as “some churches put themselves at risk, offering their freedom, independence on the altar of ‘functional wellness,’ and it has a price.”
The theologian thinks that a reversal would not harm “really Christian” institutions, as they would receive the same support as state schools, but “the forced-to-be Christian institutions shall go back to their real owner,” such as state or local government. Thus, “it would not harm, but help, the Church to focus on its real mission and service,” Gégény argued.
Yet it “would be politically risky to drastically” cut the funds, as “a significant portion of society is religious or has cultural ties to the Church,” a Rome correspondent for Hungarian Hír TV, Zsuzsanna Kukaj, told the Register.
The state-to-church transfer occurred “at the request of many local governments,” the journalist said, stressing that reversing this process would be “legally very difficult,” due to long-term contracts in place.
Moreover, many institutions under church administration “operate effectively, so most analysts believe that a new government would likely not reclaim” them, but strike “a balance between funding” state and church institutions, the correspondent explained.
Tisza speaks about “a mixture of restructuring and maintaining,” Filemon observed, saying it would mean cutting church funding. The reversal “is certainly a political risk,” and Tisza would prefer “a more liberal model,” which “would not prioritize Christian communities as chief partners in public.” Yet it “promises respect for the churches,” and that is “good,” the analyst underscored.
Since Tisza’s election program has not clarified what the role of Christian communities would be if the party won, Kukaj foresees fewer “priority projects” for the Church. The expected winner of the elections wants to end “the political influence of churches and religious communities” and start “negotiations as soon as possible to establish relations and address current issues,” the correspondent clarified.
If Tisza replaced Fidesz, “the relationship between church leadership and the faithful toward politics” would be a pressing issue, the journalist indicated.
What Do Catholics Say?
The relation or entanglement of church and state under Fidesz is a “divisive and sensitive” issue for many Catholics; indeed, some contacted by the Register declined to be interviewed for this story.
Some appreciate that the Church has finally regained the institutions lost during communism, Christian culture is preserved and church schools provide quality education, Kukaj said.
Others question political ties and subsidies that create loyalty, diminishing the prophetic voice and independence of the Church. The power of critical “voices is much stronger than ever before” because “if the clergy is mostly silent, the lay voices become obviously louder,” Gégény suggested.
Some believers think that if church institutions function, support education and social work, funding is not a problem. Thus, “the Church leadership will continue to play a cautious political role,” Kukaj added.
“Most conservative Christians appreciate Fidesz’s support for Christian communities” and families, said Filemon, while “more liberal” critics question the moral integrity of the government’s political actors.
At the same time, he eschews the church-versus-state dichotomy, as “some state functionaries are baptized Christians” and “are part of the Church like the clergy.”